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   1	  
Person	  deixis	  and	  impersonation	  in	  Iain	  Banks’s	  Complicity	  Sandrine	  Sorlin,	  Aix-­‐Marseille	  University,	  LERMA/IUF	  	   	  
Complicity	   (1993)	   written	   by	   the	   Scottish	   writer	   Iain	   Banks	   (1954-­‐2013)	  belongs	  to	  the	  category	  of	  the	  thriller	  novels.	   It	   is	   in	  the	  vein	  of	  the	  author’s	   first	  novel,	   The	   Wasp	   Factory	   (1984),	   also	   depicting	   a	   vicious	   serial	   killer.	   But	  
Complicity	  is	  stylistically	  remarkable1	  for	  its	  alternation	  of	  narratives	  featuring	  two	  different	  protagonists:	  a	  journalist	  for	  the	  Caledonian	  newspaper,	  Cameron	  Colley,	  investigating	   murders,	   whose	   narrative	   is	   in	   the	   first	   person,	   and	   a	   murderer	  relating	  his	  crimes	  with	  graphic	  details	  in	  the	  second	  person.2	  Presented	  as	  widely	  apart	  at	  the	  beginning,	  the	  threads	  of	  the	  two	  protagonists-­‐narrators’	  lives	  start	  to	  interlace	  as	   the	  novel	  enfolds.	  Without	  prior	  warning,	   there	   is	  a	   continuous	  shift	  between	   the	   protagonists’	   narratives	   from	   one	   chapter	   to	   the	   other	   and	   even	  within	  the	  same	  chapter.	  The	  readers	  have	  then	  no	  other	  choice	  than	  to	  turn	  into	  	  ‘forensic	   linguists’,	   leaning	   on	   textual	   fingerprints	   to	   determine	   which	   frame	   of	  mind	  they	  are	  in.	  Combined	  with	  other	  linguistic	  markers,	  the	  personal	  pronouns	  are	  of	  course	  particularly	  helpful,	  except	  when,	  at	  one	  point	  in	  the	  novel,	  one	  of	  the	  narrators	   stages	   what	   I	   call	   stylistic	   impersonation,	   bringing	   about	   confusion	  regarding	   the	   identity	  of	   the	  protagonists.	  At	   the	   end	  of	   the	  novel,	   adding	   to	   the	  mirror-­‐effects	   created	  by	   the	   I/you	  dyad,	   the	   ‘I’	  protagonist-­‐narrator	   switches	   to	  the	   second-­‐person	   pronoun	   that	   has	   so	   far	   been	   the	   stylistic	   preserve	   of	   the	  assaulter.	  	  	  The	   general	   aim	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   highlight	   the	   psycho-­‐cognitive	   and	  pragmatic	  effects	  produced	  by	  the	  pronominal	  alternation	  between	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  two	  opposite	  ‘mindstyles’	  (Fowler	  1977).	  It	  will	  more	  specifically	  determine	  the	  reason	  why	  Iain	  Banks	  uses	  the	  second	  person	  pronoun	  in	  his	  novel	  and,	  compared	  with	  other	  potential	  personal	  pronouns,	  what	  position	  it	  pragmatically	  constructs	  for	   the	   reader.	   Drawing	   on	   the	   psycholinguistic-­‐oriented	   approach	   of	   text	  processing	   adopted	   by	   Sanford	   and	   Emmott	   in	   their	   ‘Rhetorical	   Processing	  Framework’	  (2012),	   I	  will	   also	   delve	   into	   how	   readers	   tend	   to	  mentally	   process	  
Complicity,	   by	   trying	   to	   exhibit	   the	  mental	   representations	   they	   are	   led	   to	   build	  from	  the	  stylistic	  devices	  finely	  chosen	  by	  the	  writer.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  pragmatic	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  second	  person	  pronoun	  	   In	  his	  1993	  book	  on	  language	  and	  point	  of	  view,	  Paul	  Simpson	  left	  it	  to	  the	  reader	   to	   decide	  whether	   there	   should	   be	   added,	   besides	   his	   category	  A	   (novels	  written	  in	  the	  first	  person)	  and	  Category	  B	  (novels	  written	  in	  the	  third	  person),	  a	  category	  C	   that	  would	  gather	  what	   is	   called	  odd	  pronominal	  narratives	   (Simpson,	  1993:	  78-­‐9).	  If	  Category	  C	  is	  used,	  it	  can	  display	  the	  positive,	  negative	  and	  neutral	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modal	  shading	  that	  Simpson	  elaborates	  in	  his	  modal	  grammar	  of	  point	  of	  view.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  if	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  ‘you’	  narratives,	  they	  do	  show	  these	  three	  types	  of	  shading,	   as	   can	   easily	   be	   evidenced	   (see	   Sorlin,	   2014).	   The	   only	   problem	   facing	  Category	  C,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  the	  other	  categories,	  is	  that	   generally	   the	   second	   person	   pronoun	   can	   hardly	   be	   said	   to	   have	   a	   stable	  reference.3 	  Indeed	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   first	   person	   singular	   for	   instance,4	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  second	  person	  can	  be	  multiple	  (see	  Fludernik,	  1993,	  1994,	  1996):	  it	  could	  refer	  to	  the	  reader,	  an	  internal	  addressee,	  people	  in	  general,	  it	  can	  denote	  a	  fictional	  protagonist	  and/or	  can	  be	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐address.	  	  If,	  as	  Gérard	  Genette	  indicates,	  every	  third-­‐person	  narrative	  always	  implies	  the	   presence	   of	   an	   ‘I’	   that	   is	   at	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   enunciative	   act	   (Genette,	   1972:	  252),	   the	   same	   can	   often	   be	   said	   of	   first-­‐person	   narratives	  where	   the	   ‘I’	   can	   be	  construed	   as	   a	   ‘s/he’:	   under	   the	   speaking	   ‘I’	   saying	   ‘I’,	   there	   is	   someone	   about	  whom	  something	  is	  said,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  a	  ‘self’	  that	  is	  me	  and	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  third	  person	  (Joly,	  1990:	  21).	  This	  disguised	  similarity	  between	  first	  and	  third	  person	   seems	   to	   leave	   the	   second	   person	   aside—for	   Genette	   (1983/1988:	   133),	  second	  person	  narratives	  are	  ‘a	  rare	  but	  very	  simple	  case’	  that	  he	  integrates	  in	  his	  heterodiegetic	   category.	   If,	   on	   the	   plane	   of	   enunciation,	   ‘I’	   and	   ‘s/he’	   can	   be	  considered	  similar,	  where	  can	   the	  second-­‐person	  pronoun	  be	  situated?	   In	  novels	  where	  the	  second	  person	  notionally	  corresponds	  to	  a	  first	  person,5	  operating	  what	  Uri	  Margolin	  (1986:	  190-­‐9)	  calls	  a	  ‘deictic	  transfer’,	  can	  second-­‐person	  narratives	  be	  said	  to	  be	  part	  of	  Simpson’s	  category	  A	  (novels	  written	  in	  the	  first	  person)?	  Yet	  if	  this	  particular	  case	  is	  melted	  in	  the	  broader	  category	  A,	  what	  can	  be	  said	  about	  novels	   like	   Banks’s	   Complicity	   which	   present	   alternative	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   and	   ‘you’	  referring	   to	   two	   different	   persons?	   Here	   especially,	   the	   play	   on	   the	   I/you	   dyad	  turns	   out	   to	   be	   at	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   the	   plot.	   Rather	   than	   embodying	   discursive	  intersubjectivity	   as	   described	   by	   Benveniste	   (1974:	   82),	   the	   I/you	   dyad	   in	  
Complicity	   indeed	   exhibits,	   as	   I	   shall	   demonstrate,	   complex	   psychological	  (dis)connections	  between	  ‘self’	  and	  ‘other’.6	  	  	  
1.1.	  Depersonalised	  persona:	  the	  neutralisation	  of	  subjectivity	  	   The	  passages	  figuring	  ‘you’	  in	  the	  novel	  are	  written	  in	  a	  ‘neutral’	  mode	  that	  seems	   to	   near	   writing	   degree	   zero.	   Grammatically,	   they	   are	   marked	   by	   a	   quasi	  absence	   of	   modality,	   privileging	   confident	   grammatical	   assertions.	   Here	   is	   an	  extract	  chosen	  at	  random	  from	  the	  very	  beginning:	  	   	  	  Then	  the	  door	  closes	  and	  they	  are	  there	  in	  front	  of	  you	  and	  in	  that	  instant	  you	  see	  him	  turned	  slightly	  away,	  putting	  his	  briefcase	  down	  on	  the	  table	  beside	  the	  answer-­‐machine.	   The	   girl—blond,	   tan,	   mid-­‐twenties,	   holding	   a	   slim	   briefcase—glances	   at	  you.	  She	  does	  a	  double-­‐take.	  You	  are	  smiling	  behind	  the	  mask,	  putting	  one	  finger	  up	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to	   your	   lips.	   She	  hesitates.	   You	  hear	   the	   answer-­‐machine	   spin	  back,	   squeaking.	  As	  the	  girl	  starts	  to	  open	  her	  mouth,	  you	  step	  forward,	  behind	  him.	  	  	  	  	  You	   swing	   the	   cosh	  and	  hit	  him	  very	  hard	  across	   the	  back	  of	   the	  head,	   a	  hand’s	  width	   above	   his	   jacket	   collar.	   He	   collapses	   instantly,	   falling	   against	   the	   wall	   and	  down	  over	  the	  table,	  dislodging	  the	  answer-­‐machine	  as	  you	  turn	  to	  the	  girl.	  (Banks,	  1994:	  6)	  	  The	   cold,	   detached	   style	   is	   produced	   by	   specific	   linguistic	   choices	   made	   by	   the	  narrator,	   in	   terms	   of	   tense	   (the	   present	   tense,	   evincing	   a	   minimum	  characterisation	   of	   the	   process,	   creating	   a	   moment-­‐to-­‐moment	   description)	   and	  processes	   (concrete	   material	   processes	   referring	   to	   the	   actions	   performed,	  relational	   processes	   describing	   the	   physical	   surroundings	   and	   perception	  processes	   involving	   bodily	   senses).	   Apart	   from	   non-­‐finite	   nominal	   subordinate	  clauses,	   the	   syntax	  makes	  mostly	   use	   of	   parataxis	   and	   coordination—in	   the	   first	  ‘you’	   passage	   for	   instance	   (3-­‐9),	   only	   five	   subordinate	   clauses	   can	   be	   found	  introduced	  by	  the	  conjunction	  ‘as’	  and	  ‘though’.	  All	  the	  ‘you’	  passages	  in	  the	  book	  are	  written	   in	   the	  same	   type	  of	   style,	  often	  producing	  a	  binary	  hypnotic	   rhythm:	  ‘you	  put	  a	  ten-­‐centimetre	  strip	  across	  her	  mouth	  and	  leave	  the	  kitchen,	  putting	  the	  light	  out	  and	  closing	  the	  door’	  (8),	  ‘The	  hotel	  is	  dark	  and	  very	  quiet’	  (176).	  	  In	   her	   analysis	   of	   personal	   pronouns	   in	   English,	   Katie	  Wales	   insists	   on	   the	  inherently	   ‘egocentric’	  orientation	  of	   ‘you’,	   even	   in	   its	  most	   impersonal	  uses.	  For	  her	  indeed	  even	  generic	  ‘you’	  is	  inherently	  subjective:	  ‘a	  speaker’s	  observations	  on	  life	   will	   invariably	   be	   coloured	   by	   their	   subjective	   attitudes	   and	   experience’	  (Wales,	  1996:	  78).	  Yet	  in	  this	  novel	  the	  ‘you’	  protagonist-­‐narrator	  precisely	  sees	  to	  it	   that	   no	   subjective	   clues	   about	   himself	   transpire	   in	   his	   narrative.	   Just	   as	   he	   is	  careful	   not	   to	   leave	   any	   fingerprints	   on	   his	   crime	   scenes,	   his	   narrative	   tends	   to	  erase	  any	  linguistic	  fingerprints	  that	  might	  reveal	  something	  about	  his	  (social	  and	  geographical)	   identity,	   his	   motivations	   or	   his	   emotions.	   The	   second	   person	  pronoun	  seems	  a	  means	  to	  adopt	  a	   ‘persona’	  behind	  which	  the	  criminal	  can	  hide	  himself.	  The	   ‘you	  mask’	   is	  somehow	  the	  grammatical	  equivalent	  of	   the	  real	  mask	  he	   is	   wearing	   in	   order	   not	   to	   be	   identified.	   To	   use	   Collins	   and	   Postal’s	   term	   in	  
Imposters.	   A	   Study	   of	   Pronominal	   Agreement	   (2012),	   ‘you’	   is	   here	   definitely	   an	  ‘imposter’:	   it	   is	   notionally	   a	   first	   person	   and	   grammatically	   a	   second	   one.7	  But	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  grammatical	  imposture	  mirrors	  a	  more	  psychological	  camouflage.	  The	  pronoun	  ‘you’	  operates	  here	  a	  distancing	  effect	  which	  allows	  the	  protagonist	  not	  to	  put	  too	  much	  of	  himself	  in	  the	  narrative.	  What	  he	  performs	  are	  controlled	   ‘acts	   of	   identity’8	  in	   his	   desire	   to	   project	   the	   image	   of	   the	   rational	  assaulter	  who	  perfectly	  knows	  what	  he’s	  doing:	  ‘you	  decide	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  plan.	  It’s	  important;	  it	  shows	  that	  you	  are	  not	  just	  some	  nutter,	  and	  the	  extra	  risk	  lifts	  you	  onto	  another	  plane	  of	  chance	  and	  luck’	  (58-­‐9).	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1.2.	  Between	  distance	  and	  complicity:	  the	  defamiliarising	  familiarity	  of	  ‘you’	  A	  high	  level	  of	  construction	  marks	  the	  narrator’s	  very	  controlled	  narrative.	  Indeed	   although	   the	   ‘you’	   passages	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be,	   narratologically	   speaking,	  interior	  monologues,	   they	  can	  hardly	  be	  compared	  with	  stream	  of	   consciousness	  novels	   where	   intimate	   thought	   is	   expressed	   without	   any	   addressee	   in	   mind	   or	  prior	  construction.	   In	  novels	   like	  Joyce’s	  Ulysses	  where	  Molly’s	  monologue	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  epitome	  of	   the	  genre,	   the	   fragmented	  syntax	  mirrors	  the	   irrational	  meanders	   of	   thought,	   flowing	   at	   the	   whim	   of	   the	   narrator’s	   memories	   or	  associations	   of	   ideas.	   In	   Complicity,	   the	   second	   person	   sections	   are	   too	   self-­‐conscious	   to	  be	  mere	  records	  of	   irrational	   thoughts.	  Besides,	   they	  share	   the	  high	  degree	   of	   artificiality	   pointed	   out	   long	   ago	   by	   Dorrit	   Cohn	   about	   first-­‐person	  narrators	   of	   interior	   monologues:	   ‘forced	   to	   describe	   the	   actions	   they	   perform	  while	   they	   perform	   them,	   they	   tend	   to	   sound	   like	   gymnastics	   teachers	   vocally	  demonstrating	   an	   exercise’	   (Cohn,	   1978:	   222).9	  In	  Banks’s	   novel,	   the	   protagonist	  describes	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  crimes,	  as	  if	  narration	  and	  action	  could	  coincide.	  He	   is	   describing	   and	   commenting	   on	   his	   actions,	   using	   what	   could	   be	   called	  ‘metaperformatives’:	   ‘you	  hesitate	   for	   a	   second,	   then	  walk	  normally	   to	   the	   stairs	  and	  go	  down	  them	  with	  a	   fairly	  quick,	  heavy	  tread,	  whistling’,	   ‘you	  already	  know	  what	  you’re	  going	  to	  do,	  how	  you’re	  going	  to	  play	  this’	  (35).	  	  But	  the	  interior	  monologues	  that	  Cohn’s	  comment	  above	  refers	  to	  are	  first-­‐person	  narratives,	  like	  Dujardin’s	  Les	  Lauriers	  sont	  coupés	  for	  instance.	  Is	  the	  effect	  the	  same	  with	  second-­‐person	  narratives?	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  uncommon,	  surprising	  choice	  of	  the	  second	  person	  accentuates	  the	  high	  artificiality	  of	  such	  an	  unnatural	  narrative	   technique.	   For	   the	   Free	   Indirect	   Speech	   specialist,	  Monique	   de	  Mattia-­‐Viviès,	  the	  ‘I’	  of	  interior	  monologues	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  disguised	  third	  person:	  	  	  It	   is	   as	   if	   we	   were	   dealing	   with	   a	   masked	   temporal	   back-­‐shifting	   that	   does	   not	  appear	   in	   the	   tense	   used	   but	   that	   shows	   in	   the	   construction,	   through	   the	   self-­‐description,	  of	  an	  ‘object-­‐of-­‐discourse	  I’	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  ‘I’	  describing	  her	  own	  acts.	  The	  protagonist	  looks	  at	  herself,	  as	  if	  she	  was	  watching	  again	  the	  film	  of	  which	  she	  is	  the	  main	  actress.	  (de	  Mattia-­‐Viviès,	  2006:	  211,	  my	  translation)	  	  	  So	   the	   ‘I’	   of	   interior	   monologues	   introduces	   a	   distance	   between	   the	   ‘I’	   who	  describes	  the	  acts	  and	  the	  ‘I’	  who	  is	  the	  object	  of	  discourse,	  making	  the	  latter	  akin	  to	  a	  third	  person.	  It	  could	  be	  illustrated	  thus:	  I	  →	  he.	  As	  said	  earlier,	  ‘you’	  tends	  to	  put	   the	   self	   (I)	   at	   a	  distance	   through	   the	  deictic	   transfer	   it	   effects:	   I	  →	   you.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   in	   second	   person	   interior	   monologues,	   ‘you’	   seems	   to	   occupy	   a	  position	   in	   between	   traditional	   first	   and	   third	   person	   pronouns.	   To	   recap,	   the	  intermediary	  position	  of	  ‘you’	  can	  be	  thus	  illustrated:	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I	  → 	  he	  (‘I’	  as	  third	  person	  in	  interior	  monologues)	  
I	  → 	  you	  (the	  deictic	  transfer	  of	  self-­‐address)	  Hence:	  I	  → 	  [you]	  → 	  he	  (‘you’	  in	  interior	  monologues)	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  indeed	  that	  the	  second	  person	  pronoun	  adds	  here	  another	  link	  to	  the	  chain	  that	  separates	  further	  the	  enunciator	  from	  the	  acting	  protagonist.	  However,	  the	  distance	  created	  by	  ‘you’	  between	  narrating	  self	  and	  narrated	  self	  is	  counterbalanced	  by	  an	  effect	  of	  proximity	  with	  the	  reader	  produced	  by	  the	  second	  person.	   Indeed	  as	  Wales	  points	  out,10	  ‘you’	   (like	   ‘we’)	   ‘has	  a	   strong	   inter-­‐personal	   base,	   speaker-­‐	   or	   addressee-­‐oriented,	   reflecting	   we	   and	   you’s	   origins’	  (Wales,	   1996:	   59).	   In	   some	   sort	   of	   pragmatic	   paradox,	   the	   readers	   cannot	   help	  feeling	   addressed	   while	   knowing	   perfectly	   well	   they	   are	   not	   (directly).	   In	   the	  staging	  of	  his	  crimes,	  the	  protagonist-­‐narrator	  seems	  indeed	  to	  give	  advice	  to	  the	  reader	  on	  ‘how	  to	  do	  this…’	  and	  ‘what	  to	  avoid…’	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   perfection	   in	   crime:11	  ‘you	   go	   into	   the	   bedroom,	   checking	   the	   position	   of	   the	  mirrors;	   none	   of	   them	   ought	   to	   show	   you	   to	   anybody	   in	   the	   bathroom’	   (163).	  ‘Spirited’	   into	   the	   narrative	   through	   the	   second	   person	   pronoun,	   readers	   are	  placed	  as	  ‘in-­‐siders’,	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  action,	  watching	  the	  scene	  from	  behind	  the	  protagonist’s	   mask.	   His	   extremely	   precise	   descriptions,	   saturated	   with	   specific	  geographical	  and	  physical	  details,	  enable	   the	  readers	   to	  visualise	  everything	  as	   if	  they	   were	   there.	   ‘You’	   does	   not	   directly	   interpellate	   them	   and	   yet	   it	   seems	   to	  require	  their	  complicity—in	  echo	  of	  the	  title	  of	  the	  book—since	  a	  form	  of	  intimacy	  is	  inevitably	  forced	  upon	  them:	  they	  are	  indeed	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  have	  access	  to	  the	  mind(style)	  of	  the	  assaulter	  while	  the	  others	  (journalists	  and	  policemen)	  arrive	  after	  the	  crime	  has	  been	  committed.	  	  Textual	   ‘You’	   seems	  here	   to	  pertain	   to	   the	   last	  of	   the	   five	   functional	   types	  identified	   by	   David	   Herman	   (1994:	   378-­‐411):	   what	   with	   the	   total	   agreement	  between	  the	  grammatical	  form	  and	  its	  deictic	  function	  (‘you’	  addressing	  a	  narratee	  or	   the	   reader	   in	   a	   direct	   apostrophe,	   first	   and	   second	   type) 12 	  and	   total	  disagreement	   (when	   ‘you’	   embodies	   a	   deictic	   transfer	   or	   has	   a	   generic	  meaning	  close	  to	  ‘one’,	  third	  and	  fourth	  types),	  Herman	  theorizes	  yet	  another	  intermediary	  type	  (‘doubly	  deictic	  you’)	  that	  would	  evince	  neither	  complete	  agreement	  between	  form	  and	  function	  nor	  complete	  discord	  between	  them.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  reader	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  second	  person	  and	  yet	  he/she13	  paradoxically	  is.	  In	  Collins	  and	  Postal’s	   terms,	   it	  could	  be	  said	  that	   ‘you’	   ‘obtains	   its	  2nd	  person	  value	  from	  ADDRESSEE	  functioning	  as	  a	  secondary	  source’	  (Collins	  &	  Postal,	  2012:	  223).	  In	  Complicity,	  the	  readers	  are	  both	  excluded	  from	  narration	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	   included	   into	   it,	   whether	   they	   like	   it	   or	   not.	   The	   reader	   is	   summoned	   to	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occupy	  the	  impossible	  double	  posture	  of	  exterior	  observer	  and	  addressee	  captured	  into	  the	  narrative	  (Herman	  1994).	  	  Where	   Herman	   speaks	   of	   ‘double	   deixis’	   I	   would	   rather	   speak	   of	  ‘metaphorical	  you’,	  basing	  myself	  on	  Ricoeur’s	  definition	  of	  metaphor	  as	  what	   ‘is	  and	   isn’t’	   at	   the	   very	   same	   time14:	   ‘you’	   clearly	   isn’t	   the	   reader	   and	   yet	   it	  metaphorically	   is—this	   ties	   in	  with	  Wales’s	   remark	   that	  every	  personal	  pronoun	  should	  be	  interpreted	  ‘rather	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  we	  interpret	  metaphors’	  (Wales,	  1996:	   83),	   especially	   in	   case	   of	   imposture	   where	   the	   ‘literal’,	   morphological	  reference	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  notional,	  semantic	  one	  (Collins	  &	  Postal,	  2012).	  The	  same	   second	   person	   pronoun	   manages	   to	   perform	   two	   contrary	   effects	   in	  
Complicity,	  that	  of	  distancing	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  of	  bringing	  closer	  on	  the	  other:	  the	  protagonist-­‐narrator	  is	  distancing	  himself	  from	  the	  subject	  that	  commits	  these	  crimes	  as	  if	  to	  get	  himself	  off	  the	  hook	  and	  shifting	  the	  blame	  onto	  some	  other	  ‘you	  persona’	  and	  there	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  some	  kind	  of	  metaphoric	  transfer	  onto	  the	  reader.	   The	   distancing	   from	   the	   narrating	   ‘I’	   is	   indeed	   commensurate	   with	   the	  
rapprochement	  with	   the	   reader	   that	   the	   second	  pronoun	   inevitably	   initiates.	  The	  metaphorical	   encroaching	   upon	   the	   ‘zone	   of	   the	   reader’	   is	   what	   is	   particularly	  defamiliarising	  when	  reading.	  This	  getting	  closer	  to	  the	  readers	  is	  also	  what	  makes	  possible	  the	  rhetorical	  manipulation	  of	  their	  emotions.	  	  
1.3.	  Manipulating	  emotions	  This	   staged	   complicity	   predisposes	   the	   reader	   to	   adopt	   a	   certain	   point	   of	  view.	  In	  the	  suspense	  created	  by	  the	  narration,	  with	  some	  events	  not	  going	  the	  way	  the	   protagonist	   predicted,	   the	   readers	   can	   surprise	   themselves	   wanting	   him	   to	  succeed	   as	   if	   the	   forced	   complicity	   was	   working	   on	   them:	   this	   ‘participatory	  response’	  (Allbritton	  and	  Gerrig	  1991)	  is	  for	  me	  elicited	  by	  the	  ‘you’	  construction.	  In	   addition,	   despite	   the	   obvious	   unlawful	   actions	   of	   the	   ‘you’	   protagonist,	   the	  reader	   gets	   a	   sense	   that	   the	   victims	   deserve	   their	   plight	   as	   they	   are	   powerful	  people	   implicitly	   described	   as	   involved	   in	   amoral	   issues	   and	   getting	   away	   with	  them	  because	  of	   their	  high	  social	  status.	   In	   fact	   the	  reader’s	  reactions	   to	   the	   text	  are	  rhetorically	  manipulated.	  For	  instance,	  the	  victims’	  pain	  is	  always	  reported	  in	  a	  very	  ‘cold’	  mode:	  never	  is	  the	  reader	  brought	  to	  vicariously	  experience	  the	  pain	  of	  the	   other,	   through	  what	   Sanford	  &	  Emmott	   (2012:	   201)	   call	   ‘hot	   cognition’.15	  By	  contrast,	   the	   description	   of	   the	   victims’	   painful	   response	   to	   violence	   is	  interspersed	   with	   technical	   or	   poetic	   comments,	   as	   in	   this	   long	   passage	   on	   the	  specific	  syringe	  used:	  	  The	   syringe	   is	   a	   big	   mother;	   not	   like	   those	   dinky	   little	   disposable	   plastic	   things	  medics	  and	  junkies	  use.	  This	  device	  is	  made	  from	  stainless	  steel	  and	  glass;	  it	  has	  two	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hook-­‐shaped	  finger-­‐grips	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  barrel	  and	  it	  holds	  a	  fifth	  of	  litre.	  You	  hold	  the	  medicine	  bottle	  sealed	  with	  cling-­‐film	  upside	  down	  and	  slip	  the	  slanted	  tip	  of	  the	  big	  syringe	  needle	  into	  the	  clotted-­‐cream-­‐coloured	  liquid	  inside	  the	  bottle.	  Mr	  Oliver	  is	  still	  screaming	  behind	  the	  gag.	  (89)	  	  	  The	  positive	  connotations	  of	  some	  poetic	  descriptions	  divert	  the	  reader’s	  attention	  from	  the	  terrible	  deed	  just	  committed	  as	  if	  nothing	  happened:	  	  	   It’s	   sunset	  when	   you	   leave,	   locking	   the	   quiet	   house	   securely	   behind	   you.	   The	   sun	  flames	  orange	  and	  pink	  behind	  the	  trees	  above	  the	  house,	  the	  breeze	  is	  cool	  rather	  than	   cold,	   scented	   with	   flowers,	   the	   sea,	   and	   you	   think	   what	   a	   pleasant	   if	   rather	  bland	  place	  this	  could	  be	  to	  settle	  down.	  (168)	  	  Distractions	   of	   various	   kinds	   can	   interrupt	   the	   description	   of	   violent	   acts:	   ‘The	  music	  is	  loud.	  It’s	  a	  Eurythmics	  song	  called	  Sweet	  Dreams	  are	  Made	  of	  This’	  (163).	  Furthermore,	   the	   narrator’s	   very	   detailed	   descriptions	   tend	   to	   uglify	   the	  bodies	   of	   the	   victims	   the	   aggressor	   is	   either	   sodomizing	   or	   infecting	  with	   AIDS,	  which	  deprives	   them	  of	   all	   dignity.	  Here,	   for	   instance,	   the	  victim’s	   fart	  brings	   an	  implicit	  element	  of	  disgust	  or	  irony	  that	  deflates	  the	  horror	  being	  performed:	   ‘He	  moans	  and	  farts	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  You	  have	  to	  turn	  your	  head	  away	  from	  the	  smell,	  but	  you	  push	  the	  vibrator	  in	  further.	  You	  can	  hear	  seagulls	  crying	  outside,	  beyond	  the	  closed	  curtains’	  (38).	  With	  the	  repeated	  crimes,	   like	   in	  Burgess’s	  A	  Clockwork	  
Orange,	   the	   reader	   seems	   to	   get	   familiarized	  with	  highly	   unsettling	  descriptions.	  The	   pronoun	   ‘you’	   sometimes	   seems	   to	   address	   the	   reader	   directly	   as	   a	   reading	  accomplice	  that	  should	  by	  now	  be	  familiar	  with	  pain	  and	  screams:	  ‘He	  moans,	  then	  his	  eyes	  open	  slowly	  and	  he	  sees	  you	  and	  tries	  to	  move	  but	  he	  can’t.	  He	  screams	  down	  his	  nose.	  You	  are	  becoming	  familiar	  with	  men	  making	  this	  noise	  now’	  (103).	  	  What	  clearly	  evinces	   the	  degree	  of	  manipulation	  undergone	  by	   the	  reader	  through	  the	  protagonist-­‐narrator’s	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  criminal’s	  acts	  are	  shown	  or	  described	  to	  the	  other	  narrator	  of	  this	  novel,	  Cameron	  Colley	  (the	  ‘I’	  protagonist-­‐narrator),	   he	   can’t	   help	   vomiting	   and	   being	   haunted	   by	   the	   gorilla	  mask	  for	  days	  on	  end.	  This	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  the	  perlocutionary	  effect	  produced	  on	  the	   reader	   by	   the	   ‘you’	   narrative.	   The	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   responses	   is	  rhetorically	  managed,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  second	  person	  pronoun	  contributing	  highly	  to	  the	   double	   contradictory	   effects	   evidenced	   above:	   the	   effect	   of	   emotional	  detachment	  from	  the	  acts	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  enabling	  the	  protagonist	  to	  coldly	  put	  his	   acts	   at	   a	   distance,	   and	   that	   of	   ‘conative	   solicitude’	   (Bonheim,	   1982)	   on	   the	  other,	  with	  the	  ‘decidedly	  involving	  quality’	  of	  the	  pronoun	  (Fludernik,	  1994:	  286).	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2.	  Scenario	  mappings	  and	  mental	  processes	  In	  Complicity,	  the	  narration	  switches	  narrators	  without	  warning.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  which	  ‘footing’	  (Goffman,	  1981)	  they	  are	  on,	  the	  readers	  must	  look	  for	  references	   to	   time,	   place	   and	   movement	   and	   other	   linguistic	   footprints	   like	  personal	  pronouns,	  or	  sociolinguistic	  markers	  like	  register,	  dialect	  and	  idiolect.	  For	  in	  these	  respects,	  the	  two	  protagonists-­‐narrators’	  mindstyles	  could	  not	  be	  further	  apart.	  Cameron’s	  style	   is	  unmistakable	  with	   its	  colloquial	   register	  and	   journalese	  jargon.	  His	   lexicon	   is	   also	   sprinkled	  with	   terms	   appertaining	   to	   the	  world	   of	   the	  video	  game	  he	  is	  particularly	  fond	  of:	  	  	  No	   waste!	   No	   fat!	   Just	   exactly	   the	   right,	   most	   elegantly	   eco-­‐optimum	   system—as	  near	  to	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  as	   I	  could	  afford	  at	   the	  time,	  barely	  a	  year	  ago	  and	  I’m	  still	  paying	  the	  now	  quite	  superseded	  bastard	  off—to	  run	  this	  stunningly	  Machiavellian	  turbo-­‐screamer	  of	  a	  game;	  an	  instant	  classic,	  easily	  a	  year	  ahead	  of	  its	  time	  and	  just	  possibly	  better	  than	  sex.	  (52)	  	  	   Compared	  to	  the	  ‘you’	  narrator,	  Cameron	  gives	  a	  profusion	  of	  details	  about	  his	  emotions,	  his	  sex	  life	  and	  his	  addiction	  to	  drugs,	  cigarettes	  and	  alcohol:	  ‘I	  have	  another	  whisky	  and	  a	  bowl	  of	  Coco	  Pops	  with	  lots	  of	  milk.	  My	  hand	  keeps	  reaching	  for	   the	  place	  where	   the	   cigarette	  packet	  would	  normally	  be,	  but	   I’m	  coping	  with	  the	  cravings	  and	  surviving	  so	  far.	  I	  really	  want	  some	  speed	  but	  I	  know	  if	  I	  have	  any	  I’ll	  want	  a	  cigarette	  afterwards,	  so	  I	  leave	  it	  alone’	  (55).	  So	  the	  readers	  know	  which	  ‘frame’	   they	  are	   in	   thanks	   to	   lexical	  and	  sociolinguistic	  elements	   that	  construct	  a	  particular	  mental	  space.	  	  
2.1.	  Style	  impersonation	  and	  deception	  	  However,	   at	   one	   point	   in	   the	   narrative,	   a	   passage	   in	   the	   first	   person	   is	  recognizably	  written	  in	  the	  neutral	  mode	  of	  the	  ‘you’	  narrator,	  as	  it	  describes	  the	  spatial	  surroundings	  of	  someone	  about	  to	  commit	  a	  crime	  in	  the	  same	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	   description	   that	   the	   reader	   has	   become	   used	   to	   associating	   with	   the	  aggressor:	  	  The	  wind	  is	  loud	  in	  the	  leaf-­‐bare	  branches	  overhead.	  I	  head	  down	  the	  track	  to	  the	  road,	   then	   look	   back	   to	   the	   car;	   it’s	   almost	   fully	   hidden.	   I	   cross	   the	   tarmac	   and	  climb	  a	  fence,	  than	  take	  the	  ski-­‐mask	  from	  my	  trouser-­‐pocket	  and	  pull	  it	  over	  my	  head.	  I	  follow	  the	  line	  of	  the	  hedge	  along	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road,	  ducking	  once	  as	  a	  car	  drives	  past	  on	   the	   road;	   its	  headlights	   sweep	  along	   the	  hedge	  above	  me.	  The	  car	  carries	  on	  into	  the	  night.	  I	  start	  breathing	  again.	  (125-­‐126)	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In	  addition,	  some	  elements	  are	  recognizable	  from	  previous	  ‘you’	  passages,	  like	  the	  gloves,	  the	  mask	  and	  interjections	  like	   ‘shit!’	   that	  the	   ‘you’	  protagonist	  often	  uses	  when	   something	   goes	   wrong.	   As	   Emmott	   (2003:	   145-­‐146)	   indicates,	   there	   are	  several	   types	   of	   knowledge	   that	   the	   reader	   relies	   on	   in	   order	   to	   build	   mental	  representations	   of	   the	   text:	   general	   knowledge,	   knowledge	   of	   typical	   text	  structures,	  text-­‐specific	  knowledge	  of	  a	  particular	  fictional	  world	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	   style	   of	   a	   particular	   text.	   Here	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  writer	  wants	   the	   reader	   to	  focus	  on	  text-­‐(and	  style)-­‐specific	  knowledge	  as	  what	  is	  being	  described	  seems	  to	  fit	  in	   the	   Text	  World	   (Werth	   1999,	   Gavins	   2007)	   constructed	   in	   the	   reader’s	  mind	  from	  the	  accumulated	  contextual	   information.	  The	  reader	   is	  made	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  actions	  performed	  are	  those	  of	  the	  assaulter.	  Sanford	  and	  Emmott’s	  ‘Rhetorical	  Processing	  Framework’	  is	  of	  help	  here	  to	  grasp	  how	  the	  reader’s	  attention	  is	  psychologically	  controlled	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	   5).16	  In	   an	   automatic	   psychological	   process,	   the	   readers	   relate	   the	  mental	  representation	   of	   the	   discourse	   they	   are	   reading	   to	   something	   that	   they	   already	  know;	  this	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  Scenario-­‐Mapping	  Theory	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott	  18):	  ‘The	  strongest	  processing	  assumption	  of	  the	  Scenario-­‐Mapping	  Theory	  is	  that	  the	  reader	   automatically	   seeks	   out	   a	   known	   situation	   (scenario)	   to	   which	   a	   text	   is	  referring,	   what	   Sanford	   and	   Garrod	   [1981,	   1998]	   termed	   primary	   processing,	  leading	   to	   basic	   understanding.	   Wherever	   possible,	   text	   is	   mapped	   onto	   the	  scenario’	   (Sanford	  &	   Emmott,	   2012:	   20-­‐21).	   The	   ‘mental	  models’	   the	   reader	   has	  formed	  are	  brought	  up	  whenever	  similar	  contexts	  come	  up:	  ‘The	  basic	  suggestion	  was	   that	   mental	   representations	   of	   a	   discourse	   are	   formed	   by	   relating	   what	   is	  being	  read	  to	  a	  situation	  that	  the	  reader	  knows	  something	  about	  already’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  21).	  In	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above,	   the	  writer	  seems	  to	  want	  the	  reader	   to	  map	   the	   passage	   onto	   the	   familiar	   scenario	   of	   a	   (future)	   crime	   scene.	  Within	   Sanford	   and	   Emmott’s	   psycho-­‐linguistic	   framework,	   this	   corresponds	   to	  what	  they	  call	  the	  Rhetorical	  Focussing	  Principle,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  ‘the	  idea	  that	  writers	  aim	  to	  focus	  attention	  on	  selective	  aspects	  of	  a	  text,	  causing	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  text	  to	  be	  processed	  more	  thoroughly	  than	  others’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  101).	  	  Given	   the	   known	   scenario	   and	   its	   characteristic	   style,	  we	  may	   expect	   the	  reader’s	  attention	  to	  focus	  on	  ‘selective	  aspects’	  of	  the	  text	  and	  to	  overlook	  certain	  anomalies	   in	  the	  picture:	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  for	  one	  thing,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  narrator-­‐protagonist	  uses	  a	  car	  and	  not	  a	  bike	  as	  the	  murderer	  usually	  does.	  Even	  more	   surprising	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  he	   finds	   a	   key	   to	   open	   the	  back	  door	   (‘I	   feel	   the	  putty,	  then	  the	  embedded	  key	  and	  its	  short	  length	  of	  string.	  I	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  string	  and	  pull	  gently.	  The	  key	  comes	  out,	  clinking	  quietly	  once.	  I	  put	  my	  glove	  back	  on’,	  127).	  The	  protagonist’s	   taking	  off	   his	  muddy	   shoes	  before	   going	   to	   the	  bedroom	  where	  a	  woman	  is	  sleeping	  might,	  on	  re-­‐reading,	  sound	  like	  a	  clear	  anomaly	  for	  a	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murderer	   but	   at	   this	   stage	   the	   reader	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   ready	   to	   find	   alternative	  explanations	   that	   fit	   in	   the	   familiar	   scenario:	   he	   took	   off	   his	   shoes	   to	   reduce	  potential	  noise	   for	   instance.	  The	  research	  carried	  out	  by	  psychologists	   to	  explain	  the	  difficulty	  in	  detecting	  anomalies	  evinces	  that	  readers	  fail	  to	  detect	  them	  when	  they	   seem	   to	   ‘fit	   the	   global	   context	   well’	   (Sanford	   &	   Emmott,	   2012:	   107).	   The	  ‘shallow	  processing’	  of	  the	  information	  that	  is	  clearly	  anomalous	  at	  the	  ‘local	  level’	  is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   seems	   to	   fit	   already	   known	   text	   structures	   and	   general	  context:	   ‘the	   outcome	   of	   shallow	   processing	   is	   an	   underspecified	   mental	  
representation	   of	   the	   text	   that	   is	   shallow	   processed’	   (Sanford	   &	   Emmott,	   2012:	  104).	  	   At	  the	  sudden	  appearance	  of	  the	  inclusive	  first	  person	  plural	  pronoun	  (we),	  the	  reader	  is	  led	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  rapist	  and	  the	  woman	  in	  fact	  know	  each	  other:	  	   She	  comes	  screaming;	  I	  don’t	  think	  I’m	  going	  to	  but	  then	  I	  do.	  We	   collapse	   together	   onto	   the	   bed,	   breathing	   in	   time.	   I	   pull	  myself	   out	   of	   her.	  There	   is	   a	   faint	   smell	   of	   shit.	   I	   undo	   the	   handcuffs	   and	   lie	   there,	   holding	   her.	   She	  pulls	  the	  ski-­‐mask	  from	  my	  head.	  ‘Where	  are	  your	  shoes?’	  She	  whispers	  after	  a	  while.	  ‘In	  the	  kitchen,’	  I	  tell	  her.	  ‘They	  were	  muddy.	  Didn’t	  want	  to	  make	  a	  mess.’	  She	  laughs	  quietly	  in	  the	  darkness.	  (130)	  	  All	   along	   Cameron	   has	   impersonated	   a	   rapist	   to	   fulfil	   one	   of	   his	   mistress’s	   sex	  fantasies.	  What	   is	   unsettling	   for	   the	   reader	   is	   that	   the	   first-­‐person	   narrator	   has	  usurped	  the	  writing	  degree	  zero	  of	  the	  ‘you’	  narrator.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  the	  narration,	  the	  stylistic	  imposture	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  planting	  seeds	  of	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	   ‘you’	   character:	   is	   the	   ‘I’	   and	   ‘you’	   protagonists	   one	   and	   the	   same	   character	  after	  all?	  	  As	  reading	  goes	  on,	  the	  criminal’s	  identity	  takes	  shape:	  suspicion	  is	  likely	  to	  crystallise	   around	   Cameron’s	   childhood	   friend,	   Andy,	   presented	   as	   a	   reformed	  capitalist	  that	  has	  gone	  from	  huge	  wealth	  to	  a	  very	  modest	  life.	  When	  the	  reader	  is	  quite	   convinced	   about	   this	   deduction,	   the	   ‘you	   protagonist’	   enters	   Andy’s	   house	  describing	   it	   as	   if	   he	   was	   seeing	   it	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   He	   approaches	   a	   sleeping	  person	  and	  kills	  him	  with	  a	  log.	  Of	  course	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  reader	  is	  led	  to	   believe	   the	   victim	   is	   Andy.	   The	   policeman	   confirms	  Andy’s	   death	   to	   Cameron	  who	   is	   in	   prison,	   accused	   of	   the	   aggressor’s	   crimes.	   The	   reader	   is	   at	   this	   point	  unlikely	  to	  take	  in	  the	  hints	  dropped	  by	  the	  ‘you’	  narrator:	  ‘You	  bring	  the	  log	  down	  with	  all	  your	  might.	  It	  hits	  his	  head	  and	  you	  don’t	  hear	  the	  noise	  it	  makes	  because	  you	  cry	  out	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  though	  it’s	  you	  in	  the	  bed,	  you	  being	  attacked,	  you	  being	  killed’	   (177,	  my	  emphasis).	   In	  order	  to	  get	  away	  with	  his	  crimes,	  Andy	  has	  faked	  his	  own	  death,	  killing	  a	  friend	  he	  had	  put	  up	  for	  the	  night	  and	  setting	  fire	  to	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his	  own	  house.	  The	  way	  Iain	  Banks	  has	  constructed	  his	  narrative	  often	  brings	  the	  reader	  to	  ‘wait	  and	  see’,	  as	  primordial	  information	  comes	  up	  sparingly.	  Indeed	  as	  Sanford	  and	  Emmott	  underline,	  when	  the	   information	  given	   in	  a	  novel	  cannot	  be	  mapped	  onto	  an	  appropriate	  scenario,	  ‘secondary	  processing	  occurs’.	  This	  can	  take	  several	  forms17	  like	  ‘putting	  unresolvable	  input	  on	  a	  “wait	  and	  see”	  list’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  38).	  Slowly	   Andy’s	   personality	   gains	   in	   psychological	   complexity	   leading	   the	  reader	   to	  understand	   that	   the	  way	  Cameron	  has	  presented	  his	   friend	  Andy	   (‘my	  old	  soul-­‐mate,	  my	  surrogate	  brother,	  my	  other	  me’,	  29)	   is	  a	   far	  cry	   from	  the	  way	  the	  latter	  has	  lived	  out	  his	  relationship	  with	  Cameron:	  the	  linguistic	  and	  pragmatic	  reciprocity	  of	  the	  I/you	  dyad	  put	  forward	  by	  Benveniste	  in	  canonical	  situations	  of	  interlocution	  gives	  way	  here	  to	  a	  marked	  psychological	  dissymmetry	  between	  the	  ways	   the	   characters	   have	   respectively	   perceived	   their	   alter	   ego.	  What	   has	   been	  repressed	  by	  Cameron	  (the	  ‘ice	  incident’,	  Andy	  falling	  in	  an	  ice	  hole	  and	  Cameron	  being	   too	   shocked	   to	   go	   and	   rescue	  him)	   along	  with	   the	  psychological	   impact	   of	  Andy’s	  sister’s	  death	  and	  other	  painful	  shared	  events,	  are	  slowly	  coming	  up	  to	  the	  surface	  and	  ultimately	  lead	  Cameron,	  and	  the	  reader	  as	  well,	  to	  realise	  that	  Andy	  is	  the	   one	   who	   set	   him	   up.	   Disguised,	   Andy	   manages	   to	   kidnap	   Cameron	   after	  sabotaging	   his	   car.	   Andy	   offers	   Cameron	   two	   options:	   call	   the	   police	   right	   away	  with	  the	  phone	  Andy	  has	  left	  him	  or	  choose	  not	  to	  betray	  him	  once	  again	  and	  let	  him	  go.	  Cameron	  calls	  his	  doctor	  instead.	  	  
2.3.	  ‘You’	  and	  depth	  of	  processing	  	   ‘You’	  returns	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  of	  the	  novel	  (chapter	  13)	  but	  this	  time	  with	  Cameron	   as	   protagonist-­‐narrator.	   In	   Banks’s	   characteristically	   misleading	   style,	  the	  ‘sentence	  fragment’18	  (‘tennis	  ball’),	  in	  the	  paragraphs	  quoted	  below,	  may	  lead	  the	   readers	   down	   some	   garden-­‐path	   reasoning	   (they	   might	   think	   of	   something	  playful)	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  ‘repaired’19	  in	  the	  following	  sentence:	  	  	   	  	  	  	  A	  tennis	  ball.	  	  	  	  	  They	  say	   it’s	  about	  the	  size	  of	  a	  tennis	  ball.	  You	  slide	  your	  hand	  inside	  your	  coat	  and	  jacket	  and	  press	  up	  under	  the	  floating	  rib	  on	  your	  left	  side.	  Pain.	  You’re	  not	  sure	  whether	  you	  can	   feel	   it,	   the	   thing,	   the	  growth	   itself	   or	  not;	   you	   cough	  a	  bit	   as	  you	  press,	  and	  the	  pain	  gets	  worse.	  You	  stop	  pressing	  and	  the	  pain	  eases.	  (310-­‐311)	  	  Here	   as	  well,	   the	   second	   person	   pronoun	   seems	   to	   bring	   about	   some	   distancing	  effect	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  topic,	  that	  is	  a	  painful,	  depressing	  one	  here	  (Andy	  later	   learns	   he	   has	   cancer).	   It	   seems	   that	   ‘you’	   creates	   a	   specific	   zone	   where	  emotions	  are	  put	  at	  a	  safe	  distance	  from	  the	  character	  and	  reader	  alike.	  As	  the	  self-­‐address	  pronoun	  communicates	  here	  on	  a	  personal	  situation	  (Cameron’s)	  but	  one	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that	  could	  be	  shared	  by	  the	  reader	  at	  a	  more	  generic	   level	  on	  the	  mode	   ‘imagine	  you...’,	   the	   paradoxical	   final	   effect	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   more	   intense	   rendering	   of	  emotions	  that	  are	  paradoxically	  put	  at	  a	  farther	  distance.	  	  When	  using	   the	   second-­‐person	  pronoun,	  Cameron	  sounds	  as	   if	  he	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  his	  former	  self	  any	  more,	  the	  ‘I’	  of	  the	  past	  has	  given	  way	  to	  a	  more	  lucid	  ‘you’	   apprehending	   things	   from	   a	   different	   light,	   seeing	   the	   world	   in	   an	   alien,	  antagonistic	   way.	   This	   switch	   from	   ‘I’	   to	   ‘you’	   thus	   reflects	   this	   psychological	  estrangement	   that	   tends,	   in	   the	  end,	   to	  bring	  him	  closer	   to	  his	   former	   soul-­‐mate	  Andy	   and	   to	   the	   latter’s	   bitterness	   about	   the	  world	   gone	  mad.	   As	   Leslie	   Jeffries	  points	  out	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  pronouns	  and	  point	  of	  view	  in	  contemporary	  poetry,	  ‘you’	  seems	  to	  be	  particularly	  appropriate	  for	  depressed	  and	  anxious	  narrators:	  ‘It	  would	  be	  premature	  to	  assume	  that	  all	  such	  uses	  of	  “you”	  as	  the	  sole	  deictic	  centre	  of	  poems	  were	  equally	  anxious	  or	  depressed,	   though	  my	  data	  does	  bear	  out	   this	  interpretation’	   (Jeffries,	   2013:	   188).20	  Here,	   in	   the	   last	   words	   of	   the	   novel,	   the	  disease	  brings	  Cameron	  to	  a	  new	  emotional	  detachment,	  as	  he	  gives	  up	  on	  medical	  restrictions	  on	  tobacco	  in	  an	  ironical	  laugh:	  	  	   You	  put	  the	  tin	  away,	  sniffing.	  You	  tap	  the	  other	  packet	  in	  your	  jacket,	  then	  shrug,	  take	  it	  out	  and	  open	  it.	  You	  bought	  these	  last	  night,	  too.	  What	  the	  fuck.	  Screw	   the	   world,	   bugger	   reality.	   Saint	   Hunter	   would	   understand;	   Uncle	  Warren	  wrote	  a	  song	  about	  it.	  You	   light	   a	   cigarette,	   shake	   your	   head	   as	   you	   look	   out	   over	   the	   grey-­‐enthroned	  city,	  and	  laugh.	  (313)	  	   Perhaps	  because	  it	  is	  a	  narratological	  form	  that	  is	  less	  used	  than	  other	  more	  traditional	   modes,	   the	   ‘you’	   narrative	   tends	   to	   attract	   attention.	   This	   is	   in	   part	  borne	   out	   by	   psychological	   research	   which	   assumes	   that	   readers	   tend	   to	  remember	  such	  passages	  better	  because	  they	  process	  them	  more	  deeply:	  ‘there	  is	  a	   need	   for	   further	   exploration,	   but	   one	   possibility	   is	   that	   readers	   may	   become	  more	  attentive	  if	  they	  encounter	  such	  a	  form	  of	  address’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  173).	   This	   extra	   processing	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   reader	   can	   account	   for	   the	   extra	  involvement	   induced	   by	   the	   pronoun.	  With	   the	   second-­‐person	   pronoun,	   it	   is	   as	  though	  the	  reader	  was	  always	  already	  involved.	  Crossing	  the	  conventional	  fictional	  borders,	  ‘you’	  explicitly	  and	  continuously	  solicits	  the	  reader’s	  complicit	  presence.	  	  The	   ambiguities	   generated	   by	   the	   second	   person	   pronoun	   can	   also	   be	  measured	   if	   the	   readers	   choose	   to	   consider	   the	   relation	  between	   the	  narrator(s)	  and	   the	   protagonist(s),	   rather	   than	   the	   one	   between	   the	   protagonists-­‐narrators	  and	   the	   reader,	   which	   has	   been	   my	   main	   focus	   here.	   ‘You’	   being	   an	   address	  pronoun,	   not	   only	   may	   the	   interpretation	   according	   to	   which	   Cameron	   is	   the	  narrator	   in	   the	   ‘you	   sections’	   emphatically	   addressing	   the	  murderer	   in	   an	   after-­‐
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the-­‐event	  narrative	  be	  validated,	  but	  it	  could	  also	  be	  defended	  that	  in	  the	  last	  ‘you’	  chapter	   Cameron	   is	   only	   the	   protagonist-­‐referent	   whose	   post-­‐traumatic	   life	   is	  related	   by	   a	   narrator	   addressing	   him	   with	   ‘you’.	   Hence	   the	   versatility	   of	   the	  pronoun	  that	  can	  generate	  different	  readings	  depending	  on	  who	   it	  can	  refer	   to.	   I	  thus	  leave	  it	  open	  to	  the	  readers	  to	  decide	  on	  how	  they	  feel	  interpellated	  (or	  not)	  by	  the	  subtle	  use	  of	  person	  deixis	  in	  Complicity.21	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  Apart	   from	   William	   McIlvanney’s	   Laidlaw	   (1977)	   using	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   second-­‐person	  technique,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  very	  few	  crime	  novels,	  if	  any,	  featuring	  a	  ‘you	  narrator’	  who	  is	  also	  the	  criminal.	  Many	  thanks	  to	  Christiana	  Gregoriou	  for	  helping	  me	  to	  find	  this	  out.	  2	  The	  novel	  inspired	  a	  film	  in	  2000	  called	  ‘Complicity’	  (‘Retribution’	  in	  the	  USA).	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  3	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	   ‘we	  narrative’	  where	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  pronoun	  can	  vary	  within	  the	  same	  novel	  (see	  Jobert,	  2014).	  For	  Brian	  Richardson,	  the	  flexibility	  of	  ‘we’	  lies	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  include	  or	  exclude	  groups	  of	  different	  sizes	  and	  of	  including	  or	  not	  the	  reader,	  ‘we’	  being	  able	  to	  ‘occupy’	  both	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third	  person	  (see	  Richardson,	  2006:	  13,	  60).	   4	  The	  referent	  of	  the	  pronoun	  ‘I’	  can	  only	  be	  the	  one	  who	  says	  ‘I’	  (see	  Wales,	  1996:	  69	  for	  the	  one	  exception	  she	  could	  find	  to	  this	  fact).	  5	  Questioning	  Benveniste’s	  definition	  of	  ‘you’	  as	  ‘not	  I’	  (non-­‐je)	  (Benveniste,	  1966:	  232).	  6	  See	  also	  Scott	  McCracken’s	  comment	  on	  Complicity	  in	  Pulp:	  Reading	  Popular	  Fiction	  (1998).	  7	  The	  authors	  give	   the	   following	  definition:	  an	   imposter	   is	   ‘a	  notionally	  X	  person	  DP	   [Determiner	  Phrase]	  that	  is	  grammatically	  Y	  person’	  (Collins	  &	  Postal,	  2012:	  5).	  Personal	  pronouns	  can	  fall	  in	  the	  category	  of	  pronominal	  imposters.	  8	  For	  Le	  Page	  &	  Tabouret-­‐Keller	  (1985:	  182),	  any	  individual	  is	  an	  actor	  that	  makes	  stylistic	  choices	  in	   accordance	   with	   the	   social	   group	   he/she	   wants	   to	   be	   identified	   with.	   Social	   identities	   are	  expressed	  through	  language.	  9	  For	  a	  thorough	  distinction	  between	  interior	  monologue	  and	  stream	  of	  consciousness	  on	  linguistic	  and	  pragmatic	  criteria,	  see	  de	  Mattia-­‐Viviès,	  2006:	  183-­‐216.	  10	  Although	   Katie	   Wales	   does	   not	   exclusively	   refer	   to	   the	   use	   of	   pronouns	   in	   literature,	   the	  properties	   of	   the	   personal	   pronouns	   she	   highlights	   can	   apply	   to	   all	   genres.	  What	   varies	   are	   the	  pragmatic	  functions	  they	  tend	  to	  serve	  in	  particular	  contexts,	  like	  literature	  (see	  Gardelle	  &	  Sorlin,	  in	  press).	  11	  Some	  passages	   seem	   to	  have	   something	  of	   the	   ‘hypothetical	   you’	   (Richardson,	  2006:	  28-­‐30)	  or	  the	  ‘guide-­‐book	  you’	  category	  where	  ‘the	  actual	  addressee	  is	  described	  as	  doing	  things	  in	  a	  possible	  application	  of	  the	  instructions’	  (Fludernik,	  1993:	  235),	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  linguistic	  characteristics	   attributed	   to	   this	   use	   of	   ‘you’,	   that	   is	   ‘the	   consistent	   use	   of	   the	   imperative,	   the	  frequent	  employment	  of	   the	   future	   tense,	   and	   the	  unambiguous	  distinction	  between	   the	  narrator	  and	  the	  narratee’	  (Richardson:	  2006,	  29).	  12	  For	  an	  example	  of	  an	  explicit	  direct	  address	  to	  the	  reader,	  see	  Sorlin	  (in	  press).	  13	  I	  had	  initially	  systematically	  chosen	  the	  feminine	  pronoun	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  reader	  as	  a	  conventional	  form	  that	  I	  traditionally	  use.	  But	  as	  one	  of	  the	  reviewer	  rightly	  pointed	  out,	   it	  sounded	  strange	  as	  the	  male	  protagonist	  would	  certainly	  construct	  a	  male	  complicit	  reader.	  The	  gender	  issue	  (and	  the	  study	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  novel	  along	  gender	  lines)	  needs	  further	  developments	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  metaphors,	  ‘identity’	  flickers.	  In	  ‘Juliet	  is	  the	  sun’	  for	  instance,	  Juliet	  both	  is	  (metaphorically)	  a	  sun	  and	  isn’t	  (literally).	  As	  Ricoeur	  points	  out,	  metaphor	  is	  the	  site	  of	  a	  tension	  between	  ‘being’	  and	  ‘not	  being’.	  ‘Being	  like’	  encompasses	  ‘being’	  and	  ‘not	  being’	  (Ricoeur,	  1975:	  321).	  15	  Cold	   cognition	  would	   be	   ‘knowledge	   of’	  whereas	   hot	   cognition	  would	   be	   ‘knowledge	   through’:	  ‘cold	   cognition’	   is	   ‘simple	  knowledge	  of	  how	  one	  might	  describe	   the	  emotion,	  which	   is	   completely	  different	  from	  experiencing	  an	  emotion’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  201).	  	  16	  The	  two	  first	  strands	  of	  this	  framework	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  here	  (Fundamental	  Scenario-­‐Mapping	  
Theory	  and	  the	  Rhetorical	  Focussing	  Principle)	   leaving	  aside	  the	  third	  one	  (Experientiality)	  defined	  thus:	   ‘the	   importance	  of	  embodiment	  and	  emotion	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  experiencing	  narrative,	  and	  how	  this	  is	  contained	  and	  manipulated	  by	  writers	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Rhetorical	  Focussing	  Principle’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  6),	  since	  the	  issue	  of	  emotions	  was	  tackled	  in	  the	  previous	  part.	  17	  Other	   forms	  being	   ‘accessing	  a	  new	  scenario,	   facilitating	  new	  mappings	  of	  current	   input	  onto	  a	  new’	  or	  ‘carrying	  out	  other	  ad-­‐hoc	  operations	  to	  accommodate	  the	  input’	  (Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  38).	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  18	  I’m	   quoting	   here	   a	   stylistic	   device	   of	   attention	   grabbing	   tested	   by	   Sanford	   and	   Emmott	   (see	  Sanford	  &	  Emmott,	  2012:	  118).	  19	  The	   term	   is	   here	   borrowed	   from	   cognitive-­‐oriented	   theories	   of	   stylistics,	   where	   the	   notion	   of	  ‘repair’	   implies	   the	  necessity	   for	   the	  reader	  to	  reassess	  her	  comprehension	  of	  previous	  scenes.	   In	  Text	   World	   Theory,	   Emmott	   speaks	   of	   ‘frame	   repair’	   in	   her	   Contextual	   Frame	   Theory	   (Emmott	  1997)	  and	  Gavins	  (2007),	  building	  on	  Emmott’s	  work,	  speaks	  of	  ‘world	  repair’.	  20	  McInerney’s	   canonical	   second-­‐person	   novel	  Bright	   Lights,	   Big	   City	   seems	   also	   to	   bear	   out	   this	  hypothesis	  as	  it	  depicts	  a	  drug-­‐addicted,	  somewhat	  depressed,	  protagonist-­‐narrator	  as	  well.	  21	  Many	   thanks	   to	   one	  of	   the	   reviewers	   for	  pointing	  out	   to	  me	   this	  possible	   interpretation	  of	   the	  second	  person	  pronoun	  in	  Complicity.	  
